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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
RELIABLE FURNITURE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
AMERICAN HOME
ASSURANCE CO., WESTERN
GENERAL AGENCY, and
GENERAL ADJUSTMENT
BUREAU,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11656

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the District
Court, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, dismissing, as a matter of law, the appellant's case
against all defendants after presentation of the evidence by plaintiff-appellant. Findings and a formal
judgment were filed on April 28, 1969 (R 34-36).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff originally filed its action in the District Court, Third Judicial District against Fidelity
and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., American Home Assurance Company, Western General
Agency and General Adjustment Bureau. Subsequently, Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. was dismissed from the action and the
1

dismissal was affirmed by this court in Reliabile Furniture Co. vs. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. 14 U. 2d 169, 380 P 2d 135 (1963).
On pre-trial in the instant action, the respondent's
motions to dismiss each of the remaining parties defendant was granted; however, on appeal to this
Court that decision was reversed. Reliable Furniture
Co. vs. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. 16 U. 2d 211, 398 P. 2d 685 ( 1965). There
after an amended complaint was filed by the plaintiff adding a cause of action sounding in fraud and
the case was set for jury trial. After presentation of
the appellant's evidence, the Honorable D. F. Wilkins,
Judge, granted respondent's motion for an involuntary non-suit under Rule 41-b Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents contend that the decision of the
District Court dismissing appellant's cause of action
should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Reliable Furniture Company (hereinafter referred to as "Reliable") is a Utah corporation which has conducted furniture operations in the
State of Utah. The corporation is primarily owned by
Mr. Sam Herscovitz and his wife, with Mr. Herscovitz in complete control (R 55-56, 64). On March 30,
1961, shortly after Mr. Herscovitz arrived at the Reliable store in Ogden, a fire occurred which destroyed
2

a portion of the building and a portion of the Reliable
inventory (R 72-76).
At the time of the fire, Reliable was a named
insured under two separate policies of fire insurance.
One policy was issued by Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as "F&G") and insured Reliable against loss by fire
to its stock and inventory. The second policy was issued by American Home Assurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "American") and it insured
Reliable against business interruption loss (Exhibit
P-2).

Following the loss, Wes tern General Agency
(hereinafter referred to as "Western") requested
Mr. William J. Holmes, an independent insurance
agent in Ogden, to assign the loss to the General Adjustment Bureau, an independent adjustment company (hereinafter referred to as "GAB"). Western
is an insurance services agency providing general
services to insurance agencies in the Utah area (R
245) ( R 196). Mr. William Ball of the GAB was given the assignment. The GAB's function was to investigate and determine the amount of loss and to file
a report with the company from whom it received its
assignment (R 204, 258). The GAB had no part in
determining when, or even if, payment would be
made (R 204, 258). Mr. Herscovitz testified that he
knew that Mr. Ball's only duty in connection with this
loss was the mathematics and that Mr. Ball had nothing to do with payment (R 159, 167-168).
3

In the course of investigations seeking to determine the extent of loss under both policies, Mr. Ball
advised Mr. Herscovitz that he should not be in a hurry to settle the business interruption loss. Mr. Herscovitz concurred in this advice and was not desirous
of adjusting the business interruption loss at an early
date (R 88, 100, 139, 162). He was only anxious to
obtain the proceeds of the inventory loss (R 94) and,
after the completion of the investigation of the inventory loss, a proof of loss in relation to the inventory
loss was signed by Mr. Herscovitz on or about May
7, 1961 and forwarded to F & G (R 158).
On June 16, 1961, Mr. Day, for the first time received authority from F & G to pay the inventory loss
in the amount of $84,923.39 (R 249). Western had
no authority to pay claims in this amount and such
authority could only be given by the insurance company ( R 254). Because of the absence of a required
co-signer on June 16, 1961, the $84,823.39 check was
not delivered to Mr. Herscovitz, but an appointment
was made for a meeting in the Reliable office in Ogden on Monday, June 19, 1961, for the purpose of delivering the check and seeking to adjust the business
interruption loss (R 249, 250).
For approximately two hours in the afternoon of
June 19, 1961, Mr. Ball worked with the books and
records of Reliable, working during part of this time
with Wayne Dykstra, Reliable's bookkeeper (R 136,
209, 216, 217). At the conclusion of this investigation Mr. Ball advised Mr. Herscovitz that he comput4

ed the business interrruption loss to be in the amount
of $12,609.39, although Mr. Ball had advised Mr.
Dykstra that he thought the loss should be substantially lower ( R 217-218). There was substantial
dispute between Mr. Ball and Reliable's personnel
concerning the period of prior business activity to be
used in computing the business interruption loss. Reliable had suffered losses in the amount of $63,149.73
in the fiscal year of 1960 and business had been in reverse since April 1960 (R. 142-143). Mr. Herscovitz
wanted Mr. Ball to use years other than 1960 because
of this loss pattern (R 165-166). Mr. Herscovitz
himself filed a proof of loss on June 15, 1961 in which
he claimed a loss of $48,386.00; in the original complaint the loss was claimed to be $40,776.61; subsequently it was raised to $70,000.00 and now it is
claimed that the loss was in the area of $128,000.00
(R 151-152); Exhibit D-9, Appellant's Brief p.13).
Both Mi·. Dykstra and Mr. Herscovitz believed
the loss to be greater and expressed this to Mr. Day
and Mr. Ball (R 210). According to Mr. Herscovitz
he then demanded payment of the inventory loss (R
100). In response to this demand, Mr. Herscovitz
testified that Mr. Day said that there would be no
payment on the inventory loss until Mr. Herscovitz
signed the proof of loss in the amount of $12,609.39
( R 100). When asked the alternatives to his failure
to sign the proof of loss relating to the business interruption loss, Mr. Day stated, "arbitration on both
claims or suit in Court" (R 101). Mr. Herscovitz
5

turned to Mr. Ball and asked him if that was the way
it had to be and Mr. Ball said, "Yes, that's the way .li;
has to be" (R 101). This statement was the only
participation by Mr. Ball in the entire conversation
between Mr. Day and Mr. Herscovitz and it was stated in a soft mumble and at a time when Mr. Herscovitz knew that Mr. Ball had no connection with the
payment of the loss (R 163, 168).FN/
At this same meeting on June 19, 1961, Mr.
Herscovitz signed the proof of loss for the business
interruption loss in the amount of $12,609.39 (Exhibit D-13) and received two separate drafts; one
drawn on the account of F & Gin the amount of $84,923.39 covering the loss of inventory, (hereinafter
referred to as "F & G draft") and one drawn on the
account of American in the amount of $12,609.39 for
business interruption loss, hereinafter referred to as
the "American draft" ('R 102, 104). The American draft contained the following language on the
face of the draft: "In full settlement of Business Interruption Coverage", and on the reverse side it contained, in part, the following: "Endorsement by
payee constitutes a receipt and release for the items
mentioned on the face of this check" (Exhibit D-12).
The proof of loss signed by Mr. Herscovitz contained
no language of release and Mr. Herscovitz so underFN/

Mr. Dykstra had no specific recollection of this statement; Mr.
Day denied that any of this conversation ever occurred (R 210211, 256). However, for purposes of this appeal, we have stated
only those facts which are most favorable to Mr. Herscovitz's
version of this meeting.

6

stood that the signing of the proof of loss did not affect his rights (R 153, Exhibit D-13). He signed it
only so he could collect the F & G draft ( R 154).
On June 20, 1961, Mr. Herscovitz instructed Mr.
Dykstra to deposit the F & G draft in the Reliable
account and instructed him not to deposit the American draft (R 213). Prior to that time Mr. Herscovitz had contacted Mr. Holmes and on June 20, 1961
contacted an attorney, Mr. Spooner, for the specific
purpose of discussing the events of June 19th with
him (R 105-106, 139). Mr. Herscovitz took no further action until he had actually collected into the
Reliable account the proceeds of the F & G draft. After ascertaining that these proceeds had been collected, he then endorsed the American draft and deposited it for collection (R 106,141, 154). Shortly after
receiving the benefits from the American draft, Reliable filed suit on August 11, 1961.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
INTRODUCTION

Appellant appeals from the trial court's determination dismissing its action against all three defendants. In analyzing the correctness of this determination it is imperative to first establish the legal
theories advanced by appellant against each defendant. First as against American, plaintiff seeks to
recover for its alleged business interruption loss under the provision of the American policy (R 31-33).
7

In so doing it seeks to set aside the effect of the settlement evidenced by the language found on the American draft, asserting that it was the result of fraud
and duress. Second, as against American, Western
and GAB it seeks to recover for damages allegedly
caused by the alleged fraud of Mr. Day and Mr. Ball,
which it asserts caused it to enter into the above mentioned settlement. Appellant also apperently seeks to
claim redress from all three defendants for damages allegedly arising from the alleged fraudulent
and coercive conduct of Mr. Day and Mr. Ball ( R 2228) .FN; What distinction can be drawn between the
alleged misrepresentations in the Third Cause of Action and the allegation of fraud and coercion in the
First and Second Causes of Action is difficult to
ascertain. It would appear to relate to the same conduct.
Distilled to their essence, all of the allegations
of the complaint hinge on appellant's assertion that
it was coerced into accepting a settlement in the
amount of $12,609.39 for its business interruption
loss as a condition for its receipt of $84,923.39 for the
inventory loss. Inability to support this crucial assertion would result in the failure of all of the causes
of action. After the presentation of appellant's casein-chief it was clear that there was no evidence to
support this assertion and no evidence which would
have justified a trier of fact in returning a verdict
for appellant against any defendant.
FN/ Neither Mr. Day or Mr. Ball as individuals are parties to this
action.
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First, there was absolutely no evidence that appellant entered into a settlement of the business interrruption loss as a result of economic duress. In
fact the evidence was just to the contrary; he endorsed the American draft and obtained the proceeds
after he had collected the proceeds from the inventory
loss. Second, there was absolutely no evidence that
appellant relied on any representation of Mr. Day or
Mr. Ball. Again, the evidence was just to the contrary; Mr. Herscovitz knew they couldn't compel him
to sign a release to obtain the proceeds of the inventory loss and he consulted with counsel before endorsing the draft. Third, there was absolutely no evidence that any of the alleged representation and coercive conduct was authorized by American, Western
or GAB or that such conduct was within the scope of
the resnonsibilities of either Mr. Day or Mr. Ball.
Particularly, as to the GAB, Mr. Herscovitz testified
th::it he knew it had nothing to do with payment.
We respectfully submit that when confronted
with this complete lack of evidence supporting any
of its contentions, the trial judge was legally required
to dismiss this action.
When this matter was before this court for review in Reliable vs. Fidelity and Guaranty Insiirance
Underwriters, Inc. 16 U 2d 211398 P 2d 685 (1965)
only the bare pleadings and a transcript of pre-trial
proceedings were before the Court. Thus, appellant's
reliance on that holding is misplaced. The trial judge
rlid exactly what this Court held it should do - give
9

appellant an opportunity to present all its evidence.
This was done and it was properly found to be legally
insufficient. Additionally, a:t the time this matter
was before this Court the American draft, defendant's Exhibit D-12 was not in evidence. It is this Exhibit endorsed after the collection of the F & G draft,
which contains the language of settlement and release, not the document of June 19, 1961, which appellant asserts that he signed only because he wanted
to get the F & G draft. Such assertion has no applicability to the endorsement of the American draft.
POINT II
THE ACTION OF SAM HERSCOVITZ IN NEGOTIATING THE AMERICAN DRAFT CONSTITUTED A FULL AND FIN AL SETTLEMENT OF THE BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
CLAIM AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
THAT TT WAS THE RESULT OF FRAUD OR
DURESS.

The evidence in this case demonstrates beyond
peradventure that there was a dispute between Mr.
Ball and Mr. Herscovitz as to the amount of the business interruption loss (R 217-218). Mr. Ball believed that it should have been substantially less than
$12,000.00; Mr. Herscovitz believed it should have
been much higher. See supra pg. 5. If the dispute
could not be resolved the policy provided for a method
of resolution upon demand of either party (Exhibit
P-2). Mr. Herscovitz was familiar with this provision ( R 155), but never made any such demand either before or after he had collected the funds from the
10

F & G draft. In addition, there was a question as to
whether or not any amount was due under the policy
because of the suspicious nature of the origin of the
fire ( R 249). Thus, at no time prior to the preparation of its draft on June 19, 1961, did American agree
to any settlement. The preparation of the various
proofs of loss by appellant, either on the 15th of June
or the 19th of June did not constitute an agreement
by American to pay anything, they were merely
claims by the insured as to what he believed his loss
to be.
On its face the American draft provided that it
was "in full settlement" and it provided on the reverse side that endorsement constituted "a receipt
and release". There would appear to be no dispute
that Mr. Herscovitz was aware of these provisions at
the time he endorsed the draft and, in fact, beside
consulting an attorney, was himself a law school graduate (R 54). We submit that in these circumstances,
Reliable is bound by the clear language on the draft
and the negotiation of the American draft constituted acceptance of the conditions of payment. Any other result would be contrary to public policy and well
established legal principles. Mr. Herscovitz at the
time of endorsement and collection was free to reject
these conditions; he chose not to. American was under
no obligation to make any payment until there was
an agreement between it and the insured as to the
amount of loss and a determination as to coverage.
11

In the spirit of compromise it made its offer, appellant accepted this offer and should be bound thereby.
The general rule is stated in 1 Am. Jr. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, Section 18:
"A creditor to whom remittance is made
as payment in full of an unliquidated or disputed claim has the option either of accepting
it upon the condition on which it was sent or of
rejecting it, and if it clearly appears that the
remittance was sent upon the condition that
it be accepted in full satisfaction, then failure
to reject it will result in an accord and satisfaction. This, acceptance and use of a check
purporting to be 'in full' or employing words
of similar import, or accompanied by a letter
to that effect, amounts to an accord and satisfaction of the larger claim of the creditor if
that claim is unliquidated or disputed. The
moment the creditor indorses and collects the
check with knowledge that it is offered in full
satisfaction of a disputed claim, he thereby
agrees to the condition and is estopped from
denying such agreement. It is then that the
minds of the parties meet and the contract of
accord and satisfaction becomes complete. It
is not necessary to show that the creditor knows
the legal effect of his acceptance of the check,
and his intent in accepting the check is immaterial, since the mere acceptance will be regarded as assent."
This court has adopted with approval the above
quote and stated that acceptance of a check operates
as a full discharge when "the condition that it is to be
accepted in full satisfaction of the pending claim or
12

obligation . . . (is) expressly made." Hintze vs. Seaich, 20 U. 2d 275, 437 P 2d 202, 207 (1968). As
noted above the draft tendered to Mr. Herscovitz and
'
later negotiated by him, contained such an express
condition.
The legal effect of the endorsement is not vitiated by the fact that Mr. Herscovitz disputed the amount due or that he was accepting the claim in full
satisfaction. In 75 ALR, 905, 916, it is noted:
"Generally, where the amount due is unliquidated or disputed, and a remittance of an
amount less than that claimed is sent to the
creditor, together with a statement that it is in
full satisfaction of the claim, and the tender is
accompanied by such acts or declarations as
amount to a condition that, if the remittance
is accepted in full satisfaction of the disputed
claim, and the creditor is aware of such conditions, the acceptance of such remittance constitutes an accord and satisfaction, although
the creditor protests at the time that the amount tendered is not accepted in full satisf actwn." (Emphasis added).
The Restatement of Contracts, Section 420 observes:
·"Acceptance by a creditor of any performance tendered by the debtor as satisfaction
of a pre-existing contractual duty, or of a duty
to make compensation, is not prevented from
operating as satisfaction by the creditor's
manifested refusal to regard it."
See also the illustrations and comment under said
Section.
Appellant may not argue that payment of the
13

$12,609.39 draft was a payment of an admitted part
due and therefore not a complete settlement. In Willeston, Contracts, 3d Ed. Section 129, it is stated:
"Not infrequently, though a claim is unliquidated or the subject of a bona fide and reasonable dispute, it is conceded that at least a
certain amount is due. While it would appear
that in paying this conceded part of the claim,
the debtor was merely doing what he was previously bound to do, the law looks upon an unliquidated or disputed claim as a whole and
does not attempt to set a value upon it, or to define the extent of the debtor's legal obligation.
Accordingly, such a claim is dealt with as a
chattel is dealt with, as something the adequacy of which as consideration will not be
measured. By the weight of authority, the payment of the amount admittedly due will support a promise to discharge the whole claim.
Whether such payment is made by check or
otherwise is immaterial."
In any event, in the case at bar, this was a disputed claim with no admission by American that any
amount was due and owing on June 19, 1961, or at
the time of endorsement.
Nor should Appellant be heard to claim that the
endorsement was void because it was the result of any
fraud, duress or coercion existing at that time. The
only duress testified to by appellant's president was
the need for the inventory loss payment (R 94,
14

153) .FN; These funds had been collected by appellant
prior to the endorsement of the American draft so the
duress, if any, was alleviated. At no time during the
trial was Appellant able to articulate any theory of
fraud, duress or coercion which influenced his decision to endorse the draft and collect the funds.
In comparable cases where duress may have existed, but ended before the execution of the release,
the courts have barred recovery. Gottleib vs. Charles
Scribner Sons, 232 Ala. 33, 166 So. 685 ( 1936) ; Kall
vs. W. G. Block Co., 319 Ill. 339, 150 N.E. 254 (1926);
Ashland Coal and Coke Company vs. Old Ben Coal
Corporation, 187 Atl. 596 (Del. 1934); Neher vs.
Kerr, 70 Ind. App. 363, 123 N.E. 467 (1919).
We submit that when Appellant made a decision
to endorse the American draft, he was fully aware of
the consequences and he should not now be heard to
complain.
POINT III
THE ACTION OF SAM HERSCOVITZ IN NEGOTIATING THE AMERICAN DRAFT IN SETTLEMENT OF THE BUSINESS INTERRUPTION CLAIM CONSTITUTED A RATIFICATION OF THE EVENTS OF JUNE 19th.

FN/ Typical of appellant's position was the following testimony of
Mr. Herscovitz at page 153 of the reporters transcript:
"Q. Mr. Herscovitz, so I understand this clearly, is your testimony that the only reason you signed Defendant's Exhibit
13 which is the Proof of Loss, agreeing to the amount of the
was because Mr. Day said to you, 'If you don't sign this,
you aren't going to get your $84,000.00' is that correct?
"A. Absolutely correct."
.
Obviously, once the funds were collected the threat was meaningless.

15

Appellant argues that the trial court took the
endorsed American draft out of context and that it
should have reviewed the transaction as a whole. We
submit that it is appellant who seeks to ignore the
entire transaction and seeks only to focus on the alleged events of June 19, 1961. Typical of this attempt
is the following language from appellants brief at
page 7:
"But the case Reliable presents to this
Court is not a normal case. It is a case of fraud
and duress compelling Reliable to accept a
token settlement or face certain destruction
from lack of funds."
We believe it is fair to ask appellant a number of
questions. What compelled it to endorse the American
draft after collecting the $84,923.39? What compelled it to endorse the American draft at all? What prevented appellant from merely destroying the draft?
What prevented appellant from placing the draft in
an envelope and returning it to where it came? The
answer to all these questions is obvious - nothing,
except Mr. Herscovitz's desire to acquire "the $12,609.39 in [his] bank account." (R 155).
We submit that even if one accepts Mr. Herscovitz's testimony concerning the events of June 19,
1961, his conduct in endorsing the American draft
after the termination of any economic duress, demonstrated that he was willing to abide by the settlement of June 19, 1961 regardless of how that settlement was achieved.
16

428:

The general rule is stated in 77 A.L.R. 2d 427,
"A contract entered into under duress is
generally.considered not void, but merely voidable and 1s capable of being ratified after the
duress is removed, such ratification resulting
if a party entering into the contract under
duress intentionally accepts the benefits growing out of it, remains silent, acquiesces in it for
any consirerable length of time after opportunity is afforded to void it or to have it annulled, or recognizes its validity by acting on
it."

In this regard it should be emphasized again
that Herscovitz consulted with counsel, was himself
legally trained, and expressly made certain that the
F & G draft had cleared and that he had the available
cash on hand to continue to operate his business before endorsing the American draft. Having had the
opportunity to escape from the claimed duress, and
thereafter having endorsed the draft and accepted
the fruits of the conduct which appellant contends
was tantamount to duress, it is apparent that a ratification occurred. In this regard, the case of State vs.
Barlow, 107 Ut 292, 153 P 2d 647 (1944), is pertinent where the Court stated:
'''As a rule, in a transaction requiring
mutual consent, if consent is obtained by coercion the victim may either affirm or avoid the
tran'saction, but he may not claim the benefits
and escape the obligations." (P. 307)
Implicit in the court's language is the conclusion
17

that accepting the benefits in the face of duress constitutes ratification.
In Farrington vs. Granite Stake Fire Insurance
Co., 120 Ut. 109, 232 P 2d 754 ( 1951), the Court rejected the right of an insurance company to rescind
for misrepresentation where the insurer knew of the
facts a few days after a fire and accepted a premium
payment knowing of the fire and did nothing "till
suit was brought". The court noted :
"One who claims a right of rescission
must act with reasonable promptness, and if
after such knowledge, he does any substantial
act which recognizes the contract as in force,
such as the acceptance of more than half of the
premium would be, such an act would usually
constitute a waiver of his right to rescind."
(P. 119)
The old addage of "What is sauce for the goose,
is also sauce for the gander" is pertinent.
In LeVine vs. Whitehouse, 37 Ut. 260, 109 Pac.
2 ( 1910), the Court in considering the effect of fraud
stated:
"The rule is that, where a party has been
induced to enter into a contract by false and
fradulent representations, he may ... rescind
the contract, but the great weight of authority
holds that, if the party defrauded continues to
receive benefits under the contract after he
has become aware of the fraud, he will be deemed to have affirmed the contract and waived
his right to rescind." (P. 272)
Of importance is the fact that the court accepted
the following quote from 9 Cyc. 436 :
18

. '."The party. def_rauded will generally lose
his right to rescmd if he takes any benefit unor .does any act which implies
der
an intention to abide by it or an affirmance
of it after he has become aware of the fraud."
(Emphasis added)
The importance of the wording is the recognition of an intention or implication to affirm from the
act of accepting the benefits.
Subsequently, in the decision of Taylor vs.
Moore, 87 Ut. 493, 51P2d 222 (1935), a case involving fraud (and it should be remembered that this
court in the instant case used the word fraud), the
Utah Supreme Court approved the following quote
from the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Shappirio vs. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232 ( 1904):
" 'He cannot ... treat the property as his
own and exercise acts of ownership over it
which shows an election to regard the same as
his, and at the same time preserve his right to
rescission (sic.)'."
In M cKellar Real Estate & Investment Co. vs.
Paxton, 62 Ut. 97, 218 Pac. 128 (1923), the court
speaking of rescission as to real estate purchase contract made it clear that a person seeking to disaffirm
must do it in unequivocal terms and not exercise dominion over the property.
In the instant case the evidence shows no intent
to repudiate the settlement. First, after Herscovit;accepted both drafts, the duress ended. Especially so
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when he cashed the F & G draft since that eliminated
the essence of any "wrongdoing" in the theory of
economic duress. Thereafter, instead of repudiating
the $12,609.39 payment, he retained it and sought to
"keep his cake and eat it too." He endorsed and cashed the American draft which can only be judged to be
an acceptance of the settlement. He could not legally
negotiate the draft after the duress had terminated
and claim that the executed release was not binding.
Further, full consultation with counsel was had before any action was taken. As a consequence, ratification or waiver exists as a matter of law.
Appellant's reliance on the holding in Purv'is vs.
Penna. R. Co. 198 F. 2d 631 (3d Cir., 1952) is misplaced. A review of the facts in that case demonstrates
its inapplicability. Plaintiff, a railroad employee was
injured while working. After recovering from his injuries he went to the railroad office to collect back pay.
It was alleged that while there he signed a release of
all claims for the injury and also received $45.00.
Plaintiff believed this represented payment for back
pay. The check contained release language which the
plaintiff did not notice or read prior to, or at the time
of negotiation. The jury found that the plaintiff did
not sign the release in the railroad office, but the trial
judg;e held that he was barred from recovery because
of thr langua,ge of the negotiated check. The appeals
court reversed this finding holding that there could
be no ratification of the release in as much as the
jury found that plaintiff did not even know he had
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signed a release for his claimed injuries. Plaintiff
believed the $45 check related to back pay not to his
mJuries.
This holding has no relevance to the case at bar
where Mr. Herscovitz was aware of all the circumstances; was aware of the language of the American
draft and had the advice of counsel before acting.
POINT IV
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF FRAUD.

With reference to appellant's contention that
the trial court erred in failing to submit the case to
the jury on the issue of fraud or duress, what heretofore has been stated as the position of respondent in
the previous arguments applies with equal force.
Appellant had his payment for the inventory loss before endorsing the American draft; thus, no fraud
or coercion affected his actions at that time. Additionally, at the time Mr. Herscovitz executed the
draft, thus accepting the settlement of the business
interruption loss, he did so, not on release of Mr. Day's
statment, but rather acted based on his own investigation. Mr. Herscovitz testified that he was aware
of his rights even though he accepted the draft ( R
153, 155). Also, all the evidence shows that Mr.
Herscovitz was not relying on any statement of Mr.
Day or Mr. Ball. He was relying upon his own interpretation of the law as well as the advice of his legal
counsel.
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It is well settled that reliance is an essential in-

gredient to a cause of action for fraud. The reliance
must be on the misrepresentation of the defrauding
party. Pace vs. Parrish, 122 Ut. 141, 247 P 2d 273.
Prosser, Torts, 3d Ed. pg. 729 notes:

"In order to be influenced by the representation, the plaintiff must of course have
relied upon it, and believed it to be true. If it
appears that he knew the facts, or believed the
statement to be false, or that he was in fact so
skeptical as to its truth that he reposed no confidence in it, it cannot be regarded as a substantial cause of his conduct. If, after hearing
the defendant's words, he makes an investigation of his own, and acts upon the basis of the
information so obtained, he may be found not
to have relied on the defendant, since the fact
that he was unwilling to accept the statement
without verification is evidence that he did not
believe it." (Emphasis added).
The judgment entered by the trial court expressly found that there was no evidence of reliance by
Herscovitz to his detriment on any representation of
agents for Western General Agency or General Adjustment Bureau ( R 35).
Appellant, in its brief sets out the necessary elements to establish fraud. It recognizes the necessity
of showing reliance as well as other elements. What
it fails to do is to set forth any evidence which would
justify a trier of fact in finding that all of these elements existed in this case. Of particular importance
is the complete lack of the recitation of any evidence,
22

which established that appellant relied on the statements of Mr. Day. Immediately after the departure
of Mr. Day and Mr. Ball, Mr. Herscovitz called Mr.
Holmes. The next day he contacted a lawyer concerning this specific transaction. He gave instructions
to his bookkeeper regarding the American draft. His
entire testimony demonstrated a complete lack of belief as to the statement of Mr. Day.
Not only must there be reliance, but appellant
must show that he suffered some detriment as a result of the reliance. This appellant is unable to do.
The act which precludes any recovery in this action
is the endorsement of the American draft. As we
have emphasized repeatedly, this endorsement was
not the result of any representation, of Mr. Day or
Mr. Ball. It was endorsed only after collection of the
F & G draft, only after consultation with counsel and
was totally unrelated to the alleged happenings of
June 19, 1961.
Additionally, as to the GAB the trial court found
that Mr. Herscovitz, by his own admission, knew that
it had nothing to do with the payment and that its
only role was in determining the amount of loss. Appellant's attempt to impose liability on the GAB on
the basis of a mumbled assent to Mr. Day's alleged
statement is a hollow reed, indeed, upon which to impose liability.
Under all these circumstances we respectfully
submit that the trial court was absolutely correct in
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refusing to submit this issue to the jury. The elements
of fraud were non-existent.
POINT V
NO LIABILITY CAN BE IMPOSED ON AMERICAN, WESTERN OR GAB FOR THERE WAS
NO EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE
STATEMENTS OF MR. DAY OR MR. BALL
WERE AUTHORIZED BY THEIR PRINCIPALS
OR WERE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR
NORMAL ACTIVITIES.

As we have noted previously, appellant chose
not to sue Mr. Day or Mr. Ball individually and seeks
to impose liability on American, Western and GAB
for the alleged statements of Mr. Day or Mr. Ball.
Thus, it is incumbent upon appellant to establish
that such conduct was either authorized or within
the scope of their normal duties. Sweatman vs. Linton, 66 Ut. 208; 241 P. 309, (1925), 35 Am. Jur. 2d.
Master and Servant, Sections 550 et seq. This appellant failed to do as to any defend ant.
First, it is without dispute that the GAB is an
independent adjusting firm whose only responsibility
was to determine the amount of the loss. It had no
control over the payment of the loss, it merely filed
a report with the company who retained its services.
The alleged misconduct, if it occurred, related solely
to the payment of drafts drawn on two insurance
companies. Clearly, these payments were not within
the specific authority of Mr. Ball or the GAB, nor
were they within any apparent authority as Mr.
Herscovitz well knew. The alleged mumbled assent by
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Mr. Bell to Mr. Day's statement cannot in anyway
impose liability on GAB, Western or American.
Second, there was no evidence that would support a finding that Mr. Day was authorized by anyone to withhold delivery of the F & G draft. In fact,
it was just to the contrary. American would have no
authority to instruct Mr. Day to withhold delivery of
a draft drawn on another company. The GAB would
have no authority nor interest in the payment, or
non-payment, of either draft, and the only evidence
was that Western had not instructed Mr. Day to withhold payment. (R 257). In this connection, it should
be noted that appellant originally joined F & G as
a defendant to this action. Upon motion, F & G was
dismissed on the grounds that there was no showing that it ever instructed anyone to withhold payment and this dismissal was affirmed. Reliable Furniture Co. vs. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. ( 1963) 14 Ut. 2d 169, 380 P 2d 135.
Just as there was no evidence to support a showing
that F & G authorized such conduct, we submit that
there was no evidence to show American, Western or
GAB authorized it either. The conduct, if it occurred,
was not such as to impose vicarious liability.
Third, the statements of Mr. Day cannot be attributed to the GAB. Both Western and GAB are independent of each other with no basis in the record
for a finding that the acts of Mr. Day can impose liability upon GAB. Nor can this conduct be attributed
to American in the absence of alleged.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court in this instant case gave full latitude to the appellant to present its case in a light that
would allow it to go to the jury. There was a complete
absence of evidence which would have supported a
jury verdict against any of the defendants. Wherefore, it is respectfully submitted that this Court
should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
REX J. HANSON
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
PAUL A. RENNE
1 Maritime Plaza
Golden Gateway Center
San Francisco, California
Attorneys for Respondents
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